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1. Introduction
Many games admit multiple Nash equilibria. As is well known, even in games with
a unique Nash equilibrium, common knowledge of the game and of all players’ ra-
tionality does not, in general, suﬃce to provide them with clear guidance, see e.g.
Bernheim (1984), Pearce (1984) and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Players
cannot, in general, deduce the behavior of other players, and yet beliefs about oth-
ers’ strategy choices are pivotal to a player’s decision as to what strategy to choose.
Following Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Brandenburger (1996), it has become cus-
tomary to allude to this type of uncertainty, concerning the behavior of other players
in the game, as ‘strategic uncertainty’, as opposed to uncertainty regarding the un-
derlying structure of the game played, which is often called ‘structural uncertainty’
(see e.g. Morris and Shin [2002]).
Strategic uncertainty matters because in a lot of games, many of the equilibria
represent fragile situations in which players are supposed to choose a particular strat-
egy, even though this would be optimal only if they held knife-edge beliefs about the
actions taken by other players.1 In such settings, even the slightest uncertainty about
other players’ choices might lead them to deviate from their equilibrium strategy. It
is then arguably reasonable to require strategy proﬁl e st ob er o b u s tt os m a l la m o u n t s
of uncertainty about other players’ strategies. That human beings’ behavior in games
admitting multiple equilibria is fairly stable and predictable in the aggregate is the
ﬁnding of several experimental studies. See, e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990,
1991), Abbink and Brandts (2008) or Heinmann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009).
In this study, we formalize a notion of strategic uncertainty for games with one-
dimensional continuum action spaces and propose a criterion for robustness to such
uncertainty.2 Our approach is roughly as follows. A player’s uncertainty about others’
strategy choices is represented by a probability distribution over others’ strategy
sets, scaled with a parameter t ≥ 0. The probability distributions are assumed to be
atomless and have standard regularity properties. For each value of the uncertainty
parameter t,w ed e ﬁne a t-equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the game in which
each player strives to maximize her expected payoﬀ under her strategic uncertainty
so deﬁned. For t =0 , this is nothing else than Nash equilibrium in the original game.
We call a strategy proﬁle robust to strategic uncertainty if there exists a collection of
probability distributions in the admitted class, one for each player, such that some
accompanying sequence of t-equilibria converges to this proﬁle, as the uncertainty
parameter t tends to zero. If convergence holds for all distributions in the admitted
class, we say that the strategy proﬁle is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty.
1The equilibrium strategy remains a best response if either players are certain about the actions
of other players or they hold beliefs lying in a lower-dimensional subspace of probabilistic beliefs.
2We believe that our approach can be generalized to higher-dimensional strategy sets.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 3
Our approach is not eductive or normative: we do not attempt at telling players
what beliefs they should hold about other players’ actions. Neither is our approach
epistemic in the sense of being derived from assumptions about rationality, knowledge
or beliefs in abstract type spaces.3 Our aim is more modest: we simply study what
play may arise when players are slightly strategically uncertain, whatever the reasons
for their uncertainty may be. Contrary to the literature on global games (Carlsson
and van Damme [1993], Morris and Shin [2003]), we do not derive players’ uncer-
tainty from primitive assumptions within a meta-game in which the game at hand is
embedded. When compared to this literature, our approach is given in reduced form:
we derive players’ actions from arbitrary subjective beliefs (in an admissible class)
without deriving those beliefs from a structural source of uncertainty.
We ﬁrst study general properties of our robustness criterion. For games with
continuous payoﬀ functions, we establish existence results and clarify the relation-
ship with some existing solution concepts. In particular, we show that robustness
is a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium and that it implies, for two-player games, weak
perfection in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995). The general picture is
more complex for games with discontinuous payoﬀ functions. In particular, we show
by way of an example that there are games in which non-Nash equilibrium strategy
proﬁles are robust to strategic uncertainty.
Our robustness criterion is closely related to Selten’s (1975) “substitute perfec-
tion”. Selten deﬁned a Nash equilibrium in a ﬁnite game to have this property if
there exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy proﬁles, converging to the equi-
librium in question, such that each player’s equilibrium strategy is a best reply to
all but ﬁnitely many strategy proﬁles in the sequence. Substitute perfect equilibria
exist in all ﬁnite games, and, as Selten (1975) shows, they coincide with (trembling-
hand) perfect equilibria. However, in generic non-linear games with continuum strat-
egy spaces, no Nash equilibrium is literally substitute perfect, the reason being that
small perturbations of players’ beliefs induce small changes in their best replies (while
the discreteness in ﬁnite games allows best replies to remain unchanged under such
perturbations).
Simon and Stinchcombe (1995) extended Selten’s perfection criterion to games
with compact strategy sets and continuous payoﬀ functions. By contrast, we here
analyze games with discontinuous payoﬀ functions. Binmore (1987) and Carlsson
(1991) study equilibrium selection in the Nash demand game (Nash, 1953). Both
authors assume that players “tremble.” By contrast, in our model players do not
“tremble”; they are only uncertain about other players’ action. Young (1993) takes
the evolutionary route to show that the (generalized) Nash bargaining solution is
the only stochastically stable outcome of a game where individuals randomly drawn
3See the discussion in Brandenburger (2007).Robustness to strategic uncertainty 4
from two populations are matched to play the Nash demand game.4 Carlsson and
Ganslandt (1998) investigate “noisy equilibrium selection” in symmetric coordination
games and derive results that agree with the experimental ﬁndings on minimal eﬀort
games in Van Huyck et al. (1990). While Carlsson’s and Ganslandt’s (1998) study
is tailored to the minimal eﬀort game, we here make general assumptions concerning
players’ beliefs, assumptions that permit an operational deﬁnition of robustness to
strategic uncertainty for a large class of games. Our approach is related to that
in Friedman and Mezzetti (2005), who introduce a notion of “robust equilibria” in
ﬁnite games, as the limit of sequences of “random belief equilibria.” In a random
belief equilibrium, all players’ beliefs are random variables, and a player’s best-reply
distribution, implied by her belief distribution, is required to be consistent, in terms of
statistical expectation, with others’ beliefs about that player’s action. By contrast,
we analyze continuum-action games and impose no such interpersonal consistency
requirement.
We provide two main applications. The ﬁrst is to Bertrand competition.5 By
way of a simple duopoly example with constant and identical marginal costs, we ﬁrst
show that our reﬁnement admits the unique and weakly dominated Nash equilibrium.
By contrast, when marginal costs are strictly increasing, our robustness criterion
selects a unique strategy proﬁle out of the continuum of Nash equilibria (see Dastidar
[1995] for an analysis of such games).6 Our prediction agrees with recent ﬁndings in
experimental studies of (discretized versions of) the model, see Abbink and Brandts
(2008) and Argenton and Müller (2009).7 Abbink and Brandts (2008) remark that
“[that] price level (...) is not predicted by any benchmark theory [they] are aware of”
4The literature on the non-cooperative foundations of the Nash bargaining solution and the
so-called Nash program is enormous, see e.g. Serrano (2005) for a recent survey.
5Following Vives (1999, p.117), we take Bertrand competition to mean that (a) sellers simulta-
neously choose their prices and (b) each ﬁrm has to serve all its clients at the price it has chosen.
As mentioned by Vives (1999), for certain utilities and auctions, provision is legally mandated, and
in other markets ﬁrms have a strong incentive to serve all their clients, especially in industries in
which customers have an on-going relationship with suppliers (subscription, repeat purchases, etc.)
or where the costs of restricting output in real time are high.
6There are a number of papers focused on price competition with convex costs. Dixon (1990)
studies such competition when ﬁrms are not obliged to serve all demand, but incur a cost when
turning costumers down. He shows that under such circumstances there may still exist a continuum
of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Spulber (1995) assumes that ﬁrms are uncertain about rivals’
costs and shows that there exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As the
number of ﬁrms grows, equilibrium pricing strategies tend to average cost pricing. Chowdhury and
Sengupta (2004) show that, in Bertrand games with convex costs, there exists a unique coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium (in the sense of Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston 1987), which converges to
the competitive outcome under free entry. Our criterion selects another price, which, moreover, does
not depend on the number of ﬁrms.
7Abbink and Brandts (2008) ran experiments with ﬁxed groups of two, three, and four identical
ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that duopolists are often able to collude on the joint proﬁt-maximizing price.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 5
(p. 3). The present reﬁnement provides a theoretical foundation for their ﬁnding.
Heuristically, strategic uncertainty in these pricing games results in uncertainty-
perturbed proﬁt functions that are continuous, since the likelihood of serving the
entire market is continuous in one’s own price. The deviation incentives are asym-
metric, though. For high Nash equilibrium prices, a strategically uncertain player
has an incentive to cut her price, since she has a lot to lose if others’ prices lie a bit
below her price and little to gain if they lie a bit above it. Conversely, for low Nash
equilibrium prices, each player has an incentive to raise her price, since she has a lot
to loose if others’ prices lie a bit above her price and little to gain if they lie a bit
below. The only price that is robust to strategic uncertainty is the price at which the
monopoly proﬁt is zero. This is also the maximal Nash equilibrium price in the limit
as the number of competitors tend to inﬁnity. At that price, and no other price, the
incentives to move up and down for a strategically uncertain player are of the same
order of magnitude.
Our second application is the classical Nash (1953) bargaining game, in which two
players simultaneously bid for their share of a given pie, and obtain their shares if and
only if their bids are compatible. We show that equal division is robust to strategic
uncertainty when the two parties are equally uncertain and, more generally, that pie
sharing is related to the ‘relative uncertainty’ aﬀecting players, thus providing some
strategic foundation for the generalized Nash bargaining solution (Kalai [1977]).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides deﬁnitions
and general results. Section 3 deals with Bertrand competition and Section 4 with
the Nash demand game. Section 5 concludes.
2. Robustness to strategic uncertainty
Let G =( N,S,π) be an n-player normal-form game with player set N = {1,...,n},
in which the pure-strategy set of each player is Si = R,a n dt h u sS = Rn is the set of
pure-strategy proﬁles s =( s1,...,sn),a n dπ : S → Rn is the combined payoﬀ-function,
with πi (s) being the payoﬀ to player i when s is played.8
Let F be the class of log-concave probability distributions with ﬁnite mean. More
exactly, by log-concavity we mean cumulative probability distribution functions Φ :
R → [0,1] with everywhere positive and diﬀerentiable density φ = Φ0,s u c ht h a t
lnφ is a concave function.9 A useful feature of those distributions is that they have
However, the lowest price in the range of Nash equilibria which involves no loss in case of mis-
coordination (24 in their speciﬁcation), a much smaller number than the collusive price, is also an
attractor of play. With more than two ﬁrms in a market, it actually is the predominant market
price. This outcome is also observed in the complete information, symmetric treatment in Argenton
and Müller (2009).
8See below for how this machinery can be adapted to interval strategy sets.
9The log-concavity assumption is common in the economics literature and has applications inRobustness to strategic uncertainty 6










non-increasing.10 Examples of log-concave distributions are the normal, exponential
and Gumbel distributions.
Deﬁnition 1. For any given t ≥ 0,as t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle s is a t-equilibrium of G if,
for each player i, the strategy si maximizes i’s expected payoﬀ under the probabilistic
belief that all other players’ strategies are random variables of the form
˜ sij = sj + t · εij (1)
for some statistically independent “noise” terms εij ∼ Φij,w h e r eΦij ∈ F for all
j 6= i.
Remark 1. For t =0 ,t h i sd e ﬁnition coincides with that of Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. For t>0, the random variable ˜ sij has the c.d.f. Ft









Note that we do not require that noise terms be symmetric or have expectation
zero. In particular, in a t-equilibrium players may believe that others have a system-
atic tendency to deviate upwards or downwards.
Example 1. Let Φij be a normal distribution, N (μ,σ),w i t hμ = σ =1 , and hence
E [˜ sij]=sj +t. Then the density ft
ij is skewed to the right, as shown in the diagram
below for sj =1 0 ,a n dt =0 .3 (thick), t =0 .1 (dashed) and t =0 .05 (thin).
mechanism design, game theory and labor economics, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005).
10The latter follows from the fact that if φ is log-concave then so is Φ (see Theorem 1 in Bagnoli
and Bergstrom, 2005) and hence (φ(x)/Φ(x))0 =( l nΦ(x))00 ≤ 0.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 7








Player i’s probabilitic belief about sj
Let ˜ s−i denote the (n − 1)-vector of random variables (˜ sij)j6=i.W e n o t e t h a t a
t-equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoﬀ functions:
Remark 3. Let t>0 and Φij ∈ F for all i ∈ N and j 6= i.A s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle
s ∈ S is a t-equilibrium of G =( N,S,π),w i t hεij ∼ Φij, if and only if it is a Nash
equilibrium of the perturbed game Gt =( N,S,πt),w h e r e
π
t







































We are now in a position to deﬁne robustness to strategic uncertainty.
Deﬁnition 2. As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle s∗ in the game G is robust to strategic uncer-
tainty if there exists a collection of c.d.f:s {Φij ∈ F : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} a n da na c c o m -
panying sequence of t-equilibria, hstkik∈N with tk ↓ 0, such that stk → s∗ as k → +∞.
The strategy proﬁle s∗ is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty if this holds for all
collections of c.d.f:s {Φij ∈ F : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i}.
Remark 4. This deﬁnition can be adapted as follows to games in which the strategy

























11Without loss of generality, we normalize the left end of each interval to aj =0 .Robustness to strategic uncertainty 8






0 if x<s j
1 if x ≥ sj
Taking expectations with respect to such c.d.f:s Ft

















































We note that for any interior strategy proﬁle, s ∈ ×i∈N (0,b i), our robustness criterion
is the same, whether or not the noise terms are truncated to the strategy sets in this
way: for any sj ∈ (0,b j), the denominator in (2) converges to 1 and its derivative





















2.1. Continuous games. We here establish that, for games with continuous pay-
oﬀ functions, which we call continuous games, robustness to strategic uncertainty
implies Nash equilibrium. We also show that the converse is not true, and derive
some results concerning the relationship to some other Nash equilibrium reﬁnements
for such games.
Proposition 1. If the payoﬀ functions in G are continuous and s∗ is robust to strate-
gic uncertainty, then s∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that the claim is false. Let {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F and let
hstkik∈N be a sequence of tk-equilibria with tk ↓ 0, such that stk → s∗,w h e r es∗ is not
a Nash equilibrium in G. Then, there exists a player i and pure strategy s0







− πi (s∗)=δ for some δ>0.N o w ,πt
i converges pointwise to πi as








i (s∗) >δ / 2 for all t>0 suﬃciently
close to zero, say, for all t<τ(δ),w h e r eτ (δ) > 0.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eπt
i is continuous,














0) >δ / 3Robustness to strategic uncertainty 9
for all s0 ∈ B and t ∈ (0,τ(δ)). In particular, B contains no t-equilibrium with
t<τ(δ). But this contradicts the hypothesis that all the elements of the sequence ­
sk®∞
k=1 → s∗ are tk-equilibria. End of proof.
T h ef o l l o w i n ge x a m p l es h o w st h a tt h e r ea r ec o n t i n u o u sg a m e st h a th a v en o n -
robust Nash equilibria.
Example 2. Let G be a two-player game on R2,w h e r eπ2 (s1,s 2)=−(s2)
2,s ot h a t
2’s unique best reply is always s∗
2 =0 .L e tπ1 (s1,s 2)=−(s1)
2 (s2)
2. Then 1’s best
reply to each s2 6=0is s∗
1 =0 .F o r s2 =0 ,a l ls1 ∈ R are best replies. However,
s∗
1 =0is the unique undominated best reply. This game has inﬁnitely many Nash
equilibria, {(s1,s 2) ∈ R2 : s2 =0 }, but only one of them, (0,0) is robust to strategic
uncertainty (indeed, it is strictly robust). For example, (s1,s 2)=( 1 ,0) is not robust,
since for any t>0, the unique t-equilibrium is (0,0).
Hence, for continuous games, our deﬁnition of robustness to strategic uncertainty
is a reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium. We proceed to show that in continuous games
with (non-empty) compact strategy sets, strict robustness to strategic uncertainty
implies weak perfection in the sense of Simon and Stinchcombe (1995), while mere
robustness is suﬃcient in two-player games.
For each player i ∈ N,l e tSi =[ 0 ,b i] for bi > 0,a n dl e t∆i denote the set of
Borel probability measures over Si. For any μ ∈ ¤ = ×i∈N∆i,l e tβi(μ) ∈ ∆i denote
i’s set of mixed best replies to the mixed-strategy proﬁle μ. Following Simon and
Stinchcombe (1995), deﬁne the weak-metric distance between two mixed strategies,
μi and υi,a sf o l l o w s :




and υi (B) ≤ μi
¡
Bδ¢
+ δ, for all Borel sets B ⊂ Si},
where Bδ is the δ-neighborhood of B. Identify pure strategies with unit point masses.
Deﬁnition 3 [Simon and Stinchcombe, 1995]. For any ε>0,aweak perfect ε-
equilibrium is a completely mixed-strategy proﬁle, με ∈ int(¤),s u c ht h a t ,f o re v e r y
player i ∈ N, ρi(με
i,βi(με)) <ε . A strategy proﬁle μ∗ ∈ ¤ is weakly perfect if it is
the limit as εk → 0 of a sequence of weak perfect εk-equilibria.
The reason why strict robustness implies weak perfection is, heuristically, that
such robustness requires (inter alia) robustness to interpersonally consistent subjec-
tive beliefs, that is, subjective probability distributions about others’ (pure) strategy
choices, shared by all players but the one in question. Being interpersonally con-
sistent, a shared subjective probability distribution, concerning a player’s strategyRobustness to strategic uncertainty 10
choice, can be viewed as a completely mixed strategy for that player. For t>0
suﬃciently small, and any t-equilibrium, these distributions will place almost all
probability mass in any given ε-neighborhood to that player’s t-equilibrium strategy.
In the two-player case, only one player has to hold a belief about a given player,
so that the issue of mutual consistency of beliefs does not arise. As a result, mere
robustness to strategic uncertainty implies weak perfection.12
Proposition 2. If the payoﬀ functions in G are continuous and the strategy sets
compact, then every strategy proﬁle that is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty is
also weakly perfect. In the two-player case, every strategy proﬁle that is robust to
strategic uncertainty is also weakly perfect.
Proof: Suppose that s∗ is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty. Let Ψ1,...,Ψn ∈
F and, for each j ∈ N,l e tΦij = Ψj for all i 6= j. Clearly Φij ∈ F for all i ∈ N and
j 6= i.S i n c es∗ is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty, it is the limit as tk → 0 of a
sequence of tk-equilibria, stk. The claim is established if we can extract a subsequence










∀i ∈ N,x ∈ Si.
For each h ∈ N,l e tεh =1 /h,a n d ,f o re a c hp l a y e ri,l e tk(i,h) be the minimal









> 1 − 1/h. Such a k clearly exists. Let
k(h)=m a x i∈N k(i,h).T h e nstk(h) is a weak perfect εh-equilibrium. In the two-player
case: robustness implies that there exist Φ12,Φ21 ∈ F such that s∗ is the limit of a
sequence of t-equilibria. Let Ψ2 = Φ12 and Ψ1 = Φ21 above. End of proof.
It is not diﬃcult to verify that strategy proﬁles that are robust to strategic un-
certainty exist in continuous games if each strategy set is compact and convex, and
each payoﬀ function πi is concave in si (for every s−i):
Proposition 3. Suppose that the payoﬀ functions in G are continuous, that the
strategy sets are compact and convex, and that each payoﬀ function πi is concave in
si (for every s−i). Let Φij ⊂ F, ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i.F o re a c ht>0, the perturbed game Gt
has at least one Nash equilibrium. Moreover, G admits at least one strategy proﬁle
that is robust to strategic uncertainty.
12By contrast, our notion of strict robustness to strategic uncertainty appears to be weaker than
Simon’s and Stinchcombe’s (1995) notion of strong perfection. The reason is that they then work
with point masses (attached to the pure best reply), while our probability distributions are contin-
uous.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 11
Proof: Let G be as stated in the proposition. Let Φij ⊂ F, ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i.
Consider any sequence htki
∞
k=1 → 0,w h e r ee a c htk > 0.F o re a c hk ∈ N,s u p p o s et h a t
sk is a Nash equilibrium of Gtk. Then, sk is a tk-equilibrium of G.N o w sk ∈ S for
all k ∈ N,w h e r eS is a non-empty and compact set, so
­
sk®∞
k=1 admits a convergent
subsequence, with limit s∗ ∈ S, by the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem.
It remains to establish that for each t>0, the perturbed game Gt has at least one
Nash equilibrium. For this purpose, it is suﬃcient to show that each payoﬀ function
πt
i is continuous and concave in si (for every s−i) .W ep r o v et h i sf o rt h ec a s eo ft w o
players, but the generalization is immediate. By deﬁnition,
π
t
i (s)=E[πi (si, ˜ sj)] =
Z




i follows from the continuity of πi and Ft















πi (si, ˜ sj)dF
t














for any λ ∈ (0,1) and si,s 0
i,s j ∈ R,p r o v i n gt h a tπt
i is concave in si (for every s−i).
End of proof.
The following observation follows from Propositions 3 and 1:
Corollary 1. Suppose that the payoﬀ functions in G are continuous, that the strat-
egy sets are compact and convex, and that each payoﬀ function πi is concave in si
(for every s−i). If s∗ is the unique Nash equilibrium of G,t h e ns∗ is strictly robust
to strategic uncertainty.
Proof: Let G be as stated. By Proposition 3, G admits a robust strategy proﬁle.
By Proposition 1 this is also a Nash equilibrium. By hypothesis, G has a unique Nash
equilibrium, so this is robust to strategic uncertainty. Since the collection {Φij ⊂ F,
∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} in the proof of Proposition 3 was arbitrary, it follows that s∗ is strictly
robust to strategic uncertainty. End of Proof.
We conclude by noting that robustness to strategic uncertainty does not imply
admissibility. In other words: it does not exclude all equilibria that involve the use
of weakly dominated strategies. Indeed, as noted by Simon and Stinchcombe (1995),
admissibility is not a property that one can generally expect from Nash equilibrium
reﬁnements in continuum-action games. The following example is taken from Simon
and Stinchcombe (1995, Example 2.1).Robustness to strategic uncertainty 12




s1 if s1 ≤ s2/2
s2(1 − s1)/(2 − s2) otherwise
and π2(s1,s 2) ≡ π1(s2,s 1).T h e ﬁgure below illustrates the graph of π1(s1,s 2) for
s2 =0 .2. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium, (0,0),b u tf o re a c hp l a y e ri,
the strategy si =0is weakly dominated by all other strategies. Nevertheless, this is
a game that meets the conditions in Corollary 1, and hence the weakly dominated
Nash equilibrium (0,0) is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty.








2.2. Discontinuous games. The general picture is less clear for games with dis-
continuous payoﬀ functions. In particular, deriving general existence results proves
challenging and we will not attempt it here. Instead, we will subsequently illustrate
the workings of our robustness criteria in two well-known classes of discontinuous
games. However, before embarking on that analysis, we make two general observa-
tions. First, there exist discontinuous games with strategy proﬁles that are robust
to strategic uncertainty without being Nash equilibria. Second, there exist discontin-
uous games with strict Nash equilibria that are not robust to strategic uncertainty
(which we also show in the next section, in the context of price competition games).
We substantiate these claims by means of two examples.
Example 4. Consider the two-player game in which each player’s pure-strategy
space is R and the payoﬀ functions are:
π1 (s1,s 2)=
½
s1 if s1 <s 2
0 otherwiseRobustness to strategic uncertainty 13
and π2 (s1,s 2)=−(s2 − 1)
2. Hence, irrespective of 1’s action, 2’s best reply is s∗
2 =1 ,
and 1’s payoﬀ function is discontinuous on the diagonal in R2.I na n yt-equilibrium,
st




























Let Φ be the standard normal distribution. As t → 0, st
1 tends to 1 from below,
see diagram. Hence, the pure-strategy proﬁle (1,1) is robust to strategic uncertainty.
However, it is clearly not a Nash equilibrium of the unperturbed game.









The best reply correspondence of player 1 as a function of t.




2 if s1 = s2
1 − si otherwise
¾
for i =1 ,2. The set of pure Nash equilibria is the diagonal, s1 = s2, and all those
equilibria are strict. By continuity of the probability distributions in F:
π
t
i (s1,s 2)=1− si
for all t>0.H e n c e ,si =0is a dominant strategy in every perturbed game, so the
strategy proﬁle (0,0) is the unique t-equilibrium, for any t>0. It follows that (0,0)
is the unique strategy proﬁle that is robust to strategic uncertainty (it is even strictly
robust).Robustness to strategic uncertainty 14
3. Price competition with convex costs
As we will show in this section, our deﬁnition of robustness selects a unique Nash
equilibrium out of a continuum of equilibria in a class of price-competition games with
convex costs. Before embarking on that analysis, we brieﬂy consider the canonical
Bertrand model of pure price competition with linear costs.
Example 6. Consider two identical ﬁrms, each with constant unit cost c>0,i na
simultaneous-move pricing game à la Bertrand in a market for a homogeneous good.
Let the demand function be linear, D(p)=a−p, for all p ∈ [0,a] with a>c .13 Then,
the monopoly proﬁt function, Π(p)=( a−p)(p−c), is strictly concave with a unique
maximum at pm =( a + c)/2 and Π(pm) > 0. By contrast, the unique duopoly Nash
equilibrium, p1 = p2 = c, results in zero proﬁts. This Nash equilibrium is weakly
dominated. Nevertheless, it is robust to strategic uncertainty. For suﬃciently small
degrees of strategic uncertainty, both ﬁrms will set their prices a little bit above
marginal cost, and less so, the less uncertain they are. To see this, suppose that























· Π(pi) i =1 ,2,j6= i.
This can be rewritten as
π
t








· Π(pi) i =1 ,2,j6= i,
where the ﬁrst factor is positive and independent of pi. A necessary ﬁrst-order







i =1 ,2,j6= i. (6)
The right-hand side of (6) is a positive constant. Consequently, in the perturbed
game, it is never optimal to choose pi ≤ c or pi ≥ pm. Hence, without loss of gen-
erality, we restrict attention to pi ∈ (c,pm). On this interval, the left-hand side is
a continuous and strictly decreasing function that runs from plus inﬁnity to zero.
Hence, there exists a unique symmetric t-equilibrium price, pt, for every t>0.M o r e -
over, as t → 0, the denominator of the left-hand side has to tend to zero for (6) to
13To keep the intuition clear, we take a simple functional form but the argument extends to general
demand curves.
14We focus on symmetric error distributions in this example only for expositional convenience.
The Nash equilibrium is robust to strategic uncertainty under asymmetric distributions as well.
15It is easily veriﬁed that there does not exist any asymmetric t-equilibrium.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 15
hold. Consequently, pt ↓ c. The diagram below shows how the t-equilibrium price pt
depends on t,w h e nΦ is the standard normal distribution, a =1and c =0 .2.







The t−equilibrium price as a function of t.
The above example shows that there are discontinuous games with weakly dom-
inated Nash equilibria that are robust to strategic uncertainty. We now turn to
Bertrand games with strictly convex costs.
3.1. Convex costs. There are n ≥ 2 ﬁrms i ∈ N = {1,2,...,n} in a market for
a homogeneous good. Aggregate demand D : R+ −→ R+ is twice diﬀerentiable and
such that D(0) = qmax ∈ R and D(pmax)=0for some pmax,q max > 0.16 Moreover, we
assume that D0(p) < 0 for all p ∈ (0,p max).A l lﬁrms i simultaneously set their prices
pi ∈ R+.L e t p =( p1,p 2,...,pn) be the resulting strategy proﬁle (or price vector).
The minimal price, p0 := min{p1,p 2,...,p n},w i l lb ec a l l e dthe (going) market price.
Let m be the number of ﬁr m st h a tq u o t et h eg o i n gm a r k e tp r i c e ,m := |{i : pi = p0}|.
Each ﬁrm i faces the demand
Di(p): =
½
D(p0)/m if pi = p0
0 otherwise
All ﬁrms have the same cost function, C : R+ −→ R+, which is twice diﬀerentiable
with C(0) = 0 and C0,C00 > 0.E a c hﬁrm is required to serve all demand addressed
to it at its posted price. The proﬁtt oe a c hﬁrm i is thus
πi(p)=
½
p0D(p0)/m − C [D(p0)/m] if pi = p0
0 otherwise (7)
This deﬁnes a simultaneous-move n-player game G in which each player i has
pure-strategy set R+ and payoﬀ function πi : Rn
+ → R,d e ﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 7 ) . A
16In this section, we follow closely Dastidar (1995).Robustness to strategic uncertainty 16
strategy proﬁle p will be called symmetric if p1 = ... = pn, and we will call a price
p ∈ R+ a symmetric Nash equilibrium price if p =( p,p,...,p) is a Nash equilibrium
of G. For each positive integer m ≤ n and non-negative price p,l e t
vm(p)=pD(p)/m − C [D(p)/m]
This deﬁnes a ﬁnite collection of twice diﬀerentiable functions, hvmim∈{1,2,..,n},w h e r e
vm (p) is the proﬁtt oe a c ho fm ﬁrms if they all quote the same price p and all other
ﬁrms post higher prices (so that p is the going market price). In particular, v1 deﬁnes
the proﬁt to a monopolist as a function of its price p.
We impose one more condition on C and D, namely, that the associated monopoly
proﬁt function, v1, is strictly concave. More exactly, we assume that v00
1 < 0 and
v0
1 (pmon)=0for some price pmon ∈ (0,p max). Since the cost function is strictly con-
vex by assumption, this concavity assumption on v1 eﬀectively requires the demand
function to be “not too convex”.17 We have v1(pmon) ≥ 0. By convexity of the cost
function, there exists prices p ∈ (0,p max) at which all n ﬁrms, when quoting the same
price p, make positive proﬁts, vn(p) > 0.
The game G has a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria.18 For any number of
ﬁrms, n ≥ 2,l e tˇ pn ∈ (0,p max) be the price p at which vn(p)=0and let ˆ pn ∈ (0,p max)
be the price p at which vn(p)=v1(p). Dastidar (1995, Lemmas 1, 5 and 6) shows
existence and uniqueness of ˇ pn and ˆ pn and that ˇ pn < ˆ pn. As also shown in Dastidar
(1995, Proposition 1), all prices in the interval PNE
n =[ ˇ pn, ˆ pn] are symmetric Nash
equilibrium prices in the game G, and no price outside this interval is a symmetric
Nash equilibrium price.
As shown in Dastidar (1995, Lemmas 4 and 6), there exists a unique price ¯ p
at which a monopolist makes zero proﬁt, v1 (¯ p)=0 ,a n d ,m o r e o v e r ,¯ p ∈ (ˇ pn, ˆ pn).
Dastidar (1995, Lemma 7) also shows that both ˇ pn and ˆ pn are strictly decreasing
in n. In the present setting, it is easily veriﬁed that ˇ pn ↓ 0 and ˆ pn ↓ ¯ p, and hence
PNE
n → (0, ¯ p],a sn →∞ .
Example 7. Consider a duopoly with identical ﬁrms with quadratic cost functions,
C (q)=cq2,w h e r ec =0 .2, and linear aggregate demand: D(p)=m a x {0,1 − p}.
The diagram below shows the graphs of v1 (dashed curve) and v2 (solid curve). The
associated set, PNE
2 ,i st h ei n t e r v a l[1/11,3/13], indicated by the two solid vertical
lines, and ¯ p =1 /6 is indicated by the dashed vertical line.
17This is a more stringent assumption than the one made in Dastidar (1995), who instead assumes
that there exists a unique monopoly price.
18Dastidar (1995) and Weibull (2006) have shown existence and multiplicity of Nash equilibria
under weaker conditions.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 17








Monopoly (dashed) and duopoly (solid) proﬁts, as functions of a common price p.
We make two further observations. First, that ˆ pn cannot exceed the monopoly
price, and second, that the pricing game G admits no asymmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. ˆ pn ≤ pmon for all n>1.
Proof: Dastidar (1995; Lemma 3) shows that, if vn(p) ≥ v1(p) then v1(p) >
v1(p − α), ∀α>0 for p − α ∈ [0,p).S o ,i fp is a Nash equilibrium, then the left-
derivative of v1 at p must be positive. The concavity of v1 implies that ˆ pn ≤ pmon.
End of proof.
Proposition 5. Every Nash equilibrium in G is symmetric.
Proof:L e t(p1,...,pn) be a Nash equilibrium. Suppose, ﬁrst, that pi < minj6=i pj
for some i.I fpi < ˆ pn,t h e nﬁrm i could increase its proﬁt by unilaterally increasing
its price. Hence, pi ≥ ˆ pn.I f pi ≤ pmon,t h e na n yﬁrm j 6= i could increase its
proﬁt by unilaterally decreasing its price to pi and earn v2(pi) > 0 instead of zero. If
pi >p mon then ﬁrm i can increase its proﬁt by a unilateral deviation to pmon. Hence,
pi ≥ minj6=i pj for all i. Suppose, secondly, that pi =m i n j6=i pj and that pk >p i for
some k.E i t h e rv|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi) > 0 or v|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi)=0 .( I fv|j∈N:pj=pi|(pi) < 0,t h e n
i can proﬁtably deviate to pmax a n de a r nz e r op r o ﬁt.) In any case, k can proﬁtably
deviate to pi and make a positive proﬁt since by strict convexity of C,i fvl(p) ≥ 0,
then vl+1(p) > 0. Hence, pi = pj for all i,j ∈ N. End of proof.
3.2. Robust price equilibrium. We proceed to apply the robustness deﬁnition
f r o mS e c t i o n2t ot h ep r i c i n gg a m ed e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n3 . 1 .L e tt>0 and suppose
that a ﬁrm i holds a probabilistic belief of form (1) about other ﬁrms’ prices. For
any price pi that ﬁrm i might contemplate to set, its subjective probability that anyRobustness to strategic uncertainty 18
other ﬁrm will choose exactly the same price is zero. Hence, with probability one, its
own price will either lie above the going market price or it will be the going market
price and all other ﬁrms’ prices will be higher, so i will then be a monopolist at
its price pi. From equation (3), each ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function in the perturbed game
Gt =( N,S,πt) is, for any t>0,d e ﬁned by
π
t





















The second factor being positive and independent of pi,ap r i c ep r o ﬁle p is a Nash
equilibrium of Gt if and only if

















and the restriction p ∈ [¯ p,pmon] is non-binding, since v1 (p) < 0 for all p<¯ p, v1 (p) > 0
for all p ∈ (¯ p,pmon),a n dv0
1 (p) < 0 for all p>p mon.F o r a n y t>0,l e t ¯ Gt be the
normal-form game (N,[¯ p,pmon]
n ,u t). For any t>0,ap r i c ep r o ﬁle p is a t-equilibrium
in the pricing game G if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game ¯ Gt.
Proposition 6. Let t>0 and assume that Φij ∈ F ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i.T h e n ¯ Gt has at
least one Nash equilibrium. Moreover, any such Nash equilibrium pt is interior.
Proof: We note that for given t>0, each player’s strategy set is non-empty,
convex and compact and each player’s payoﬀ function is continuous. By Weier-
strass’s maximum theorem, each player’s best reply correspondence is non-empty
and compact-valued. By Berge’s maximum-theorem, it is also upper hemi-continuous.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in ¯ Gt thus follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point the-
orem if, in addition, each player’s best-reply correspondence is convex-valued. In
order to verify this, ﬁrst note that no equilibrium price can lie on the boundary of
the strategy set in ¯ Gt,s i n c e∂ut
i/∂pi is positive at its left boundary and negative at
its right boundary. Hence, any Nash equilibrium of ¯ Gt is in (¯ p,pmon)
n.I tr e m a i n st o
show that the set arg maxpi∈(¯ p,pmon) ut
i (p) is convex. For this purpose, note that
p
t





if and only if
p
t
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Since v1 is strictly concave by assumption, also ln[v1 (·)] is strictly concave. By as-
sumption, φij is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave on an open interval, which,
by Theorem 3 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), implies that also the survival func-
tion, 1−Φij, is log concave. Hence, each term in the above sum is a concave function
of pi (given pj and t). Concavity is preserved under summations, so the maximand
is concave, and thus i’s best-reply correspondence is convex-valued. End of proof.
Theorem 1. The Nash equilibrium (¯ p,..., ¯ p) is strictly robust to strategic uncer-
tainty. No other strategy proﬁle of G is robust to strategic uncertainty.
Proof: Let {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F. Consider any sequence htki
∞
k=1 → 0,w h e r e
each tk > 0.F o re a c hk ∈ N,l e tpk be a Nash equilibrium of ¯ Gtk. Since all games
¯ Gtk have the same strategy space, [¯ p,pmon]
n, and this is non-empty and compact, the
sequence hptki
∞
k=1 contains a convergent subsequence with limit in [¯ p,pmon]
n, accord-
ing to the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem. Hence, without loss of generality we may
assume that limk→∞ pk = p∗ ∈ [¯ p,pmon]
n.
First, we prove that p∗
i = p∗
j for all i,j ∈ N. For this purpose, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tn o
price can lie on the boundary of the strategy set in ¯ Gt,s i n c e∂ut
i/∂pi is positive at










































Hence, ¯ p<p k
i <p mon for all i and k, and thus ¯ p ≤ p∗

























where hij is the hazard-rate function of Φij.C o n s i d e r a ﬁrm i ∈ N.S u p p o s e t h a t
p∗
j <p ∗
i for some j 6= i,a n dl e tε = p∗
i − p∗
j > 0. Then, there is a K such that
pk
i − pk
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i) as k →∞ ,s i n c ev1
is continuous, so v1 (p∗
i)=0 . Hence, p∗
i =¯ p. But this contradicts the hypothesis
p∗
i >p ∗
j ∈ [¯ p,pmon]. Hence, p∗
j ≥ p∗
i. Since holds for all i and j 6= i, we conclude that
p∗
j = p∗
i for all i,j ∈ N.
Secondly, we prove p∗





> 0 on (¯ p,pmon) and all














→ 0 ∀i,j 6= i
as k → +∞. Suppose that p∗
i > ¯ p.T h e nv1 (p∗








→ 0 ∀j 6= i
implying that pk
i <p k
j for all k suﬃciently large. But, by the same token: since
p∗
j = p∗
i,f o ra l lj 6= i,w ea l s oh a v ep∗
















i for all k suﬃciently large. Both strict inequalities cannot
hold. Hence, p∗
i =¯ p for all i ∈ N. In sum: the only strategy proﬁle that is robust
to strategic uncertainty is (¯ p,..., ¯ p). The strict robustness claim follows immediately
from the fact that the collection {Φij : ∀i ∈ N,j 6= i} ⊂ F above was arbitrary. End
of proof.
Example 8. Consider again a duopoly with identical ﬁrms, with quadratic cost
function, C (q)=0 .2q2, and linear aggregate demand: D(p)=m a x {0,1 − p}.
Suppose that both ﬁrms’ uncertainty takes the form of normally distributed noise,
ε1,ε 2 ∼ N (0,1).W et h e nh a v e¯ p =1 /6 ≈ 0.167. The necessary ﬁrst-order condition
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The diagram below shows these best-reply curves (solid and dashed, respectively)
and t =0 .1,w i t h¯ p marked by thin straight lines.














The best-reply curves in the perturbed pricing game.
The next diagram displays the best-reply curves of both players for t =0 .25 (solid
curves), t =0 .1 (thin curves), and t =0 .05 (dashed curves). As t decreases, the
intersection of the associated pair of curves approaches (¯ p, ¯ p)=( 1 /6,1/6),t h ei n t e r -
section between the thin horizontal and vertical lines.









Convergence of t-equilibria towards (¯ p, ¯ p)Robustness to strategic uncertainty 22
4 . T h eN a s hd e m a n dg a m e
The Nash demand game (Nash, 1953) is a two-player game G =( N,S,π),w i t h
strategy sets S1 = S2 =[ 0 ,1]. The players simultaneously submit “bids”. The payoﬀ
to a player who bids s1, while the other player bids s2,i s
πi (s1,s 2)=
½
si if s1 + s2 ≤ 1
0 otherwise .
As is well-known, this game admits a multiplicity of Nash equilibria: for each λ ∈
[0,1], (λ,1 − λ) is a strict Nash equilibrium. Besides, s1 = s2 =1is a Nash equilib-
rium, though not strict.
Our robustness criterion has little general cutting power in this game. However,
sharp results can be obtained in special cases. In particular, equal division is robust to
strategic uncertainty when the two parties are equally uncertain, while in situations
of asymmetric uncertainty, the party that is less uncertain obtains more than half the
pie, in some cases even the full pie.
From equation (3), each player i’s payoﬀ function in the perturbed game, Gt =




























for i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. Since by hypothesis Φij is strictly increasing, the ﬁrst factor is




























































Proposition 7. Let Φ12,Φ21 ⊂ F and t>0. There exists a t-equilibrium, and every
t-equilibrium is interior. A strategy pair (st
1,s t
2) ∈ (0,1)
2 is a t-equilibrium if and
only if conditions (11) and (12) are met.
Proof:As t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle (st
1,s t
2) ∈ [0,1]










j) (13)Robustness to strategic uncertainty 23
for i =1 ,2 and j 6= i. In order to establish existence of t-equilibrium, we note
that, given t>0, each player’s strategy set is non-empty, convex and compact, and
each player’s payoﬀ function is continuous. By Weierstrass’s maximum theorem,
each player’s best reply correspondence is thus nonempty- and compact-valued. By
Berge’s maximum-theorem, it is also upper hemi-continuous. Hence, existence of t-
equilibrium follows from Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem if, moreover, each player’s
best-reply correspondence is convex-valued. In order to establish this, let t>0 and
st




































































since φij > 0 by assumption. From these observations it follows that







Thus, any t-equilibrium is interior. It remains to show that the set argmaxsi∈(0,1) πt
i(si,s t
j)
is convex. For this purpose, note that
s
t







if and only if st
i =1− st
j − txt, where (after a change of variables and taking the
logarithm):
x



































By assumption, lnφij is concave, which, by Theorem 9 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom











. But this implies that the maximand (being
the sum of one concave and one strictly concave function) in (14) is strictly concave.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 24
Thus i’s best-reply correspondence is singleton-valued. This establishes the ﬁrst claim
in the proposition. Since each player’s payoﬀ function is concave in his or her own
strategy, the necessary ﬁrst-order conditions (11) and (12) are also suﬃcient, thus









k∈N is a sequence of t-equilibria where tk ↓ 0 as k →







































Proof: Let t>0 and suppose that (st
1,s t
2) solves (11) and (12). Let wt =
(1 − st
1 − st














F i r s tn o t et h a ts i n c est
1,s t
2 ∈ (0,1),b o t hΦ12(−st
2/t) and Φ21(−st
1/t) are monotonically
decreasing in t with limits limt→0 Φ12(−st
2/t)=0and limt→0 Φ21(−st
1/t)=0 . Claim
(i) is equivalent with the claim that for all subsequences hwtkik∈N with tk → 0,
wtk → +∞. Suppose not. Then there is a subsequence that converges to some real












































However, this is impossible, since the right-hand side tends to plus inﬁnity.19 Suppose,





21 (wtk) will then tend to some nonnegative limit or to plus inﬁnity. Again, this
is impossible, since the right-hand side of (15) will then tend to plus inﬁnity while
the left-hand side tends to minus inﬁnity. This establishes claim (i).
In order to establish claim (ii), ﬁrst note that by (i), for all t>0 suﬃciently
small, we must have zt > 0,w h e r ezt =1− st
1 − st
2. We may thus presume, without
loss of generality, that zt ∈ (0,1) for all t. It remains to show that zt → 0 as
t → 0. Suppose not. Since (0,1) is non-empty and bounded, there then exists, by
19By continuity, 1/h
−
12 (wtk) → 1/h
−
12 (w∗) and 1/h
−
21 (wtk) → 1/h
−
21 (w∗).Robustness to strategic uncertainty 25
the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, a subsequence hztkik∈N with tk → 0 such that
ztk → z∗ ∈ (0,1]. However, for each t>0 we also have
z
t =1− t ·




Φ21 (zt/t) − Φ21(−st
1/t)
φ21 (zt/t)
















But the latter is necessary for the c.d.f. Φ12 to have ﬁnite expectation, which we have
assumed. This establishes claim (ii).






φ21 (wt) · [Φ12 (wt) − Φ12(−st
2/t)]







φ21 (wt) · [Φ12 (wt) − Φ12(−st
2/t)]















By claim (i), wt → +∞, from which claim (iii) follows immediately. End of proof.
From this last proposition we obtain three corollaries. The ﬁr s tm a k e st h ep o i n t
that if the two parties are equally uncertain about each other’s bid, then robustness
to strategic uncertainty implies equal division:
Corollary 2. T h eu n i q u es t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle that is robust to symmetric uncertainty
(Φ12 = Φ21)i ss1 = s2 =1 /2.
Proof: If Φ12 = Φ21 and (st
1,s t
2) ∈ (0,1)
2 is a t-equilibrium for each t>0,t h e n
st
1+st
2 → 1 and st
1/st
2 → 1/2, by claims (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 8. Hence st
i → 1/2
for i =1 ,2. End of proof.
The following example illustrates this result.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 26
Example 9. Let Φ12 = Φ21 = Φ b et h en o r m a ld i s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm e a nz e r oa n du n i t
variance. The ﬁrst diagram shows the two best-reply curves for t =0 .1.














A close-up, also inserting the curves for t =0 .05 (dashed):








By hypothesis, both inverse hazard rates, h
−
ij (w)=φij (w)/Φij (w) are non-
increasing in w,f o ri =1 ,2 and j 6= i. Arguably, if player i is much more uncertainRobustness to strategic uncertainty 27




ij (w) → 0 as w → +∞. It fol-
lows immediately from Proposition 8 that if one player is much more uncertain than
the other, then robustness to strategic uncertainty requires that the latter obtains
the whole pie:




12 (w) → 0 as









2 is a sequence of tk-equilibria, with all tk > 0





To see that distributions do not have to be too diﬀerent, consider the following
variation of the above example:
Example 10. Consider the setup from the previous example with the exception that
player 1’s belief has higher variance (σ =3 ), that is, player 1 is more uncertain about
2 than 2 is uncertain about 1. The following diagram shows that, for t =0 .1,p l a y e r
1 obtains less than half:












From part (iii) of Proposition 7 we have that limt→0 st
1/st









12 (w) as a function of w.I nt h e
limit, the player with the less noisy belief, in this example player 2, obtains the whole
pie.Robustness to strategic uncertainty 28









Our third and ﬁnal corollary establishes that (a) every division of the pie is robust
to some strategic uncertainty, (b) none of these divisions is strictly robust, and (c)
no other strategy pairs are robust to strategic uncertainty:
Corollary 4. A strategy proﬁle (s1,s 2) is robust to strategic uncertainty if and only
if s1 + s2 =1 .N os t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle is strictly robust to strategic uncertainty.
Proof: For the ﬁrst claim, the proof is constructive, and uses claim (iii) in Propo-
sition 8. Consider ﬁrst (s1,s 2)=( 1 ,0).L e t Φ12 be the Gumbel distribution with
mean 0 and variance 1,a n dl e tΦ21 be the Gumbel distribution with mean 0 and
















12 (w)=0 . Hence, any sequence of t-equilibria (with respect
to Φ12 and Φ21) converges towards (1,0) as t → 0,s o(1,0) is robust to strategic
uncertainty. By reversing the variances, (0,1) is robust to strategic uncertainty.
Consider now any (s1,s 2) such that 0 <s 1 ≤ 1/2 and s2 =1− s1.L e t μ =
ln(s2/s1).L e tΦ21 be the Gumbel distribution with mean 0 and variance 1 and let











Any sequence of t-equilibria (with respect to Φ12 and Φ21) converges to the strategy
proﬁle (s1,s 2),s o(s1,s 2) is robust to strategic uncertainty. A similar argument applies
to any (s1,s 2) such that 0 <s 2 ≤ 1/2 and s1 =1− s2. Finally, consider (s1,s 2)
such that s1 + s2 6=1 . By claim (ii) in Proposition 8, no sequence of t-equilibra
converges to (s1,s 2). So no such strategy pair is robust to strategic uncertainty. ThisRobustness to strategic uncertainty 29
establishes the ﬁrst claim in the corollary. The second claim follows immediately
from the above constructive proof, since for any strategy proﬁle (s1,s 2) ∈ [0,1]
2 we
identiﬁed Φ12,Φ21 ∈ F for which any sequence of t-equilibria converges to another
strategy proﬁle. End of proof.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a way to model strategic uncertainty in a straightforward
fashion. After deﬁning a robustness criterion and deriving a handful of general results,
including its relations to Nash equilibrium in continuous and discontinuous games,
we have investigated in detail two well-known games with discontinuous payoﬀsa n d
continuum action spaces, each game admitting inﬁnitely many Nash equilibria. Ar-
guably, strategic uncertainty is considerable in those games, due to the richness of
the strategy spaces and the large number of equilibria. In the Bertrand competi-
tion game with convex costs, we showed that our notion of robustness to strategic
uncertainty selects a unique Nash equilibrium, that, moreover, ﬁgured prominently
in recent laboratory experiments. In the Nash demand game, we showed that ro-
bustness to symmetric strategic uncertainty singles out the Nash bargaining solution.
Contrary to Carlsson (1991), where players “tremble” when making their bids, our
predictions are not distribution independent. We ﬁn dt h a tt h ep a r t yw h oi sl e a s t
uncertain about the other party’s bid obtains the bigger share.
We believe that our concept of robustness to strategic uncertainty has a wide
domain of application and that it comes at a relatively low analytical cost when used
for predictions in simultaneous-move games.
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